The paper analyzes the effects of changes to regulatory policy and to monetary policy on crossborder bank lending since the global financial crisis. Cross-border bank lending has decreased, and the home bias in the credit portfolio of banks in the euro area has risen sharply, but not among banks outside the euro area. Our results suggest that expansionary monetary policy in the source countries has encouraged cross-border lending in euro area and non-euro area countries. By contrast, while increases in financial supervisory power or independence have encouraged credit outflows from source countries, tighter capital regulation has lowered cross-border lending since the crisis. However, these effects have largely been driven by euro area countries. The findings thus underline the importance of regulatory arbitrage as a driver of cross-border bank flows since the global financial crisis.
Motivation
After a period of continuously rising cross-border financial claims, the 2007-08 global financial crisis (henceforth: GFC) led to a partial reversal of international capital flows. The retrenchment has been particularly pronounced for cross-border bank lending, as banks have withdrawn from foreign markets. Figure 1 illustrates the evolution of cross-border lending by 26 source countries of crossborder credit since 2000: Total cross-border claims have significantly decreased in response to the GFC and did not resume the pre-crisis upward trend since then. Moreover, the evolution of crossborder claims has been more volatile compared to the pre-crisis period.
Some of the retrenchment in cross-border banking might have been cyclical. However, part of the adjustment seems to be structural, given that growth in cross-border bank claims has not significantly picked up during the recovery -even though the liquidity provision by central banks has been abundant since the onset of the crisis. Loan markets haven gotten increasingly segmented, especially in the euro area, with banks focusing more on their national markets. As a consequence, home bias in banks' portfolios has increased. Most importantly, there is a tremendous amount of heterogeneity with which cross-border bank flows have evolved since the crisis. This suggests that while the crisis may have functioned like a common shock, the effects have been highly different across sectors and regions. This may be explained by push factors (in source countries of banks), pull factors (in recipient countries) or both.
The purpose of this paper is twofold. We first analyze the role of changes in regulatory policy and in monetary policy in influencing cross-border bank flows. Recent data from the International Banking Statistics by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) suggest that the development of crossborder bank claims has been quite heterogeneous. For example, it can be observed that credit to the euro area declined most, whereas claims against emerging market economies tended slightly upwards ( Figure 2 ). Given these heterogeneous developments, our goal is to analyze how the structure of cross-border bank lending has changed since the GFC and how different regions are affected. A special focus is on the evolution of cross-border lending in the euro area, given the euro area financial crisis that has hit in early 2010. We study the determinants of the structural changes in cross-border banking in the aftermath of the GFC. In particular, we are interested in the importance of specific push and pull factors that have been recently discussed, namely adjustments in banking regulation and the role of unconventional monetary policy in advanced countries.
In a second step, we ask how the home bias in the credit portfolio of banking systems has been affected by changes in regulatory and monetary policy since the crisis. The analysis of the home bias is a complementary analysis as it takes a different perspective on the same question of the drivers of cross-border banking. Using the bilateral home bias between country pairs as the focus of the analysis allows taking into account more directly the portfolio decision of banks, i.e. it investigates how changes to regulatory policy and monetary policy have influenced the decision of banks to invest in a particular country compared to the home country and third countries.
As discussed in previous studies, differences in banking regulation may be an important push or pull factors for cross-border bank claims (e.g. Houston, Lin and Ma, 2012) , and hence for credit home bias. Stricter regulatory requirements since the crisis may increase banks' operating costs abroad.
This could make foreign lending less efficient and thus discourage international lending. Another driving factor for cross-border banking may be regulatory arbitrage: If regulatory conditions differ across countries, banks may be attracted by regions offering a less restrictive regulatory environment. Using information on changes in different aspects of banking regulation provided by Barth, Caprio and Levine (2013) , we investigate the effects on bilateral bank lending and credit home bias.
One specific element that has been strongly emphasized, in particular in fora such as the G20, is the role of the unconventional monetary policy in advanced economies, and whether this has affected cross-border capital flows, including banking. Given the extended period of expansionary monetary policy, banks operate in an environment of low interest rates with bond yields and credit margins falling. Extensive policy support has eased financial market stress during the last quarters, such that risk appetite has resurged (Bernanke 2013 , BIS 2013b . Under these circumstances, banks may "search for yields" by leaning their foreign activities towards higher-yielding markets. We analyze the role of unconventional, expansive monetary policy by using various proxies for the monetary policy stance, such as the expansion of central bank balance sheets and reserves held by commercial banks at central banks.
Understanding potential structural changes in banks' international lending activities is highly important for policy makers for several reasons. First, bank lending is particularly important for small and medium-sized firms. If external funding from abroad gets scarce, the costs of borrowing for certain groups of borrowers may significantly increase in some countries. Second, the financing of cross-border trade may suffer from increasingly segmented loan markets -with adverse effects on international trade flows. Third, international banking sector integration has not only enhanced cross-border lending, but also other types of capital flows. If cross-border banking decreases, other international capital flows may be reduced as well. This may imply, for instance, less risk-sharing between countries and higher external funding costs for firms. Moreover, credit market fragmentation reduces competitive pressures in the banking system (Bremus 2013) , and can aggravate credit market distortions arising from the dominance of large national banks (Bremus and Buch 2013) .Our empirical analysis investigates how bilateral bank flows have changed from before the global financial crisis in 2008-09 to afterwards. The empirical model is, in essence, a gravity-type model in which we try to explain the change in bilateral bank lending through a number of control variables commonly used in gravity models, such as the size of the economy, trade and openness.
Our focus then is on the impact of regulatory changes and of monetary policy on this change in bilateral bank lending. A first key result is that a more expansionary monetary policy in the source country induces higher bank lending abroad. This result is fairly robust using alternative proxies for monetary policy. Nevertheless, the effect of expansionary policy since the global financial crisis on cross-border bank lending is particularly strong if both source country and host country are in the euro area. This suggests that monetary policy in the euro area indeed played a stabilizing role and prevented an even sharper increase in financial fragmentation.
Turning to regulatory policies, we find that a higher degree of independence and power of the financial regulator in the host country encourages cross-border bank lending. However, there is a significant degree of heterogeneity across countries. A higher degree of supervisory independence in the source country relative to the host country is actually associated with less bank lending for euro area host countries.
Similarly results are found for capital stringency. The tighter the stringency requirements in the host country, the lower are the cross-border bank flows. However, this result is entirely driven by bank flows within the euro area, i.e. when both source and host countries are in the euro area. The analysis using the change in the home bias instead of the change in bilateral capital flows broadly confirms these general findings.
The empirical results of the paper have a number of policy implications. For one, they stress the importance of monetary policy as a stabilizer of cross-border bank flows. Interestingly, the findings are suggest that tighter bank regulation and capital requirements may have contributed to the decline in cross-border bank lending, in particular in the euro area. This raises a number of questions.
Is this the result of an effort of banks to deleverage after the global financial crisis and during the European crisis? Or have regulators induced pressure on banks to focus more of their activity at home, rather than abroad?Our research is closely linked to different strands of literature. MilesiFerretti and Tille (2011) find that the decline in international capital flows during the GFC differs depending on the time period, the region, and the type of capital flows considered. They show that cross-border lending dropped most after the crisis and has become less stable since. In a similar vein, Lane (2014) provides evidence that international debt-type flows, particularly those related to the banking sector, were more affected during the GFC than equity-type financial flows. Moreover, Lane (2013a, b) presents evidence for a boom-bust cycle in international capital flows during the period [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] , and finds that the recovery in 2010-2012 has been stronger for international capital flows to the emerging and developing world than for the industrialized economies. We contribute to this literature by exploring policy-related drivers of the different evolution of cross-border bank claims across countries and regions.
Using aggregate bilateral bank lending data from the BIS, Cetorelli and Goldberg (2011) show that cross-border lending to emerging markets was significantly reduced during the crisis. They find that foreign lending decreased more in banking systems which were more vulnerable to a drying up of U.S. Dollar funding, while policy interventions like the Vienna Initiative mitigated the reduction in cross-border lending. Bruno and Shin (2013) analyze driving factors of international bank capital flows and find that bank leverage and hence the balance sheet capacity of banks play a crucial role in driving international bank capital flows. Based on bilateral banking data from the BIS and regulatory information from Barth et al. (2008) for the period 1996 -2007 , Houston et al. (2012 conclude that banks shift credit activities towards countries with more lenient banking regulation. Our approach differs as we concentrate on different policy drivers of adjustments in cross-border banking comparing the post-and the pre-crisis regimes.
De Haas and van Horen (2012) use loan-level data from syndicated loan issuances for the world's largest banks. They find that, during the GFC, foreign banks have cut back lending less from countries that host an affiliated subsidiary, that are geographically close, and that have built up relationships with local banks. Hence, closeness characteristics of recipient countries have been important for cross-border lending during the GFC. Gianetti and Laeven (2012) analyze the geographic structure of syndicated loan issuances, also using loan-level data. They find a "flight home" effect during crisis periods: banks reallocate lending from foreign to domestic borrowers with this reshuffling being independent of borrower quality. Instead of analyzing cross-border banking during the crisis, we explore changes in the driving factors of cross-border banking in the aftermath of the GFC.
Applying the gravity model used extensively in the trade literature to finance and banking, a large set of studies have linked cross-border lending and investment to "distance factors" between two countries' banking systems (see for example Brüggemann et al. 2012 , Blank and Buch 2007 , Buch 2005 , Okawa and van Wincoop 2012 or Portes and Rey 2005 . These studies show -both theoretically and empirically -that cross-border lending and investment increase the larger the size of the financial sectors, the lower bilateral distance and other information frictions, and the lower regulatory barriers are. In a similar vein, Hauswald and Marquez (2006) theoretically show that credit availability increases in the proximity between banks and their borrowers, since banks can overcome information asymmetries more easily the closer they are to their clients.
Another group of papers uses bank-level data for different countries. Düwel et al. (2012) find that German multinational banks have cut back foreign lending if parent banks got more risk averse, while study the global liquidity management of U.S. multinational banks.
Their findings suggest that U.S. multinational banks that were hit by liquidity shocks during the GFC reshuffled internal funding to foreign affiliates in core investment destinations by drawing liquidity from traditional funding locations. Rose and Wieladek (2011) use bank-level data for the UK banking system and find that the share of loans going to the UK has been reduced by foreign banks which have profited from government support. This increased homeward bias can be interpreted as financial protectionism. We complement these studies by analyzing the impact of changes in regulatory and monetary policy since the crisis for credit home bias at the banking sector level.
Finally, Fratzscher, Lo Duca and Straub (2012) analyze the impact of U.S. monetary policy since the global financial crisis on cross-border capital flows, finding evidence that especially U.S.
unconventional policies have pushed capital into emerging markets since 2009. However, the focus of this paper is different as it merely covers portfolio flows, and not cross-border bank flows as is the case here.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we discuss specific driving factors of the change in cross-border credit that are related to regulatory and monetary policy.
Section 3 describes our empirical methodology. Section 4 presents the regression results for changes in cross-border lending and credit home bias, while section 5 concludes.
Push and pull factors of changes in cross-border bank claims
The goal of this paper is to study potential drivers of structural change in cross-border bank claims since the GFC. In the following, we will concentrate on the role of changes in policy variables for cross-border bank claims that haven been discussed recently.
First, structural changes in cross-border lending may be due to changes in financial regulation. A priori, the effect of stricter regulatory requirements in source and/or destination countries is not clear. On the one hand, stronger institutions and better regulation could pull foreign capital to the destination market. For example, using BIS-data for the period 1985 -2002 and up to 140 countries, Papaioannou (2009 finds that institutional improvements are an important pull factor for foreign credit. On the other hand, tighter banking regulation may reduce foreign lending and increase home bias in the credit portfolio of banks. After the experiences during the GFC, national regulation aims at facilitating the resolution of internationally active banks in order to better shield domestic tax payers from potential losses (The Economist, 2012) . Stricter regulatory requirements for foreign banking activities may increase banks' operating costs abroad. This could make foreign lending less efficient and thus pull bank credit back home (Okawa and van Wincoop 2012, Brüggemann et al. 2012 ).
Moreover, new regulatory rules favor government debt as a safe asset. If the trend of increasing shares of government bonds in banks' portfolios increases, this may reduce riskier and thus more funding-expensive banking activities like cross-border lending. Another driving factor for crossborder banking may be regulatory arbitrage. Banks may exploit differences in regulation by concentrating more on markets offering less restrictive regulation (Houston et al. 2012) .
Summarizing the key arguments of this debate, we use data on banking regulations provided by Barth et al. (2013) This hypothesis relates to the argument that the implementation of a new regulatory framework since the crisis comes along with increased information and funding costs especially when lending abroad, such that international lending gets less attractive.
By contrast, if regulation gets tighter in the source country, this may induce banks to transfer more of their business abroad, namely to those countries that offer a less restrictive regulatory environment.
Hence, we compute the difference between regulatory stringency in the source and in the destination country in order to investigate whether Hypothesis 2: Regulatory arbitrage pushes credit to countries with lower regulatory standards.
That is, we examine whether the result found by Houston et al. (2012) , namely that tighter regulation in the source country encourages credit outflows while tighter regulation in the destination country discourages credit inflows, can also explain changes in cross-border bank claims in the pre/post crisis comparison aimed at here.
As a second set of driving factors, we are interested in the effects of unconventional monetary policy on changes in cross-border bank claims. Bernanke (2013) points out that a high provision of central bank liquidity may induce banks to invest in markets with higher yields, like the emerging economies. In the next section, we lay out the empirical strategy for testing these three hypotheses.
Empirical methodology
In order to analyze the effects of banking regulation and unconventional monetary policy, we estimate, in a first step, a cross-sectional model with the dependent variable being the change in bilateral cross-border credit between the post-and the pre-crisis period. This allows us to answer the question whether policy changes have affected the adjustment of international bank lending since the crisis. We also differentiate between the effects of regulation and monetary policy in the euro area and in non-euro area countries. Second, we study the impact of our variables of interest on cross-border bank claims for the pre-crisis period and for the post-crisis period separately. To this goal, we use changes in cross-border bank claims prior to the crisis (2005) (2006) and after the crisis In analogy to the change in cross-border lending, we are interested in the role of changes in regulatory variables pre/post crisis -both in the source and in the destination countries. Hence, we compute the (simple) difference between the post-and the pre-crisis average for the three regulatory indexes described above. Table 1 (a) indicates that in the source countries, which mainly include industrialized economies all three regulatory indexes have increased since the crisis, on average. The average rise in capital stringency has been largest. In the group of receiving countries, capital stringency and supervisory independence have increased, but less than in the source countries. Supervisory power has even decreased in the destination countries.
Data and summary statistics
In order to test our hypothesis whether changes in regulatory arbitrage drive changes in cross-border bank lending, we compute bilateral gaps between the regulatory stance in the source and receiving country. A positive value of this gap indicates stricter regulation in the source country relative to the destination country. This may set an incentive for banks to exploit arbitrage by extending more credit abroad to countries with weaker regulations. As for the other variables, we compute changes in arbitrage between the post-and the pre-crisis period and find that capital stringency has become more similar across countries in our regression sample (Table 1( and divide by GDP (in USD) which is available from the WDI.
Control variables.
Besides our main variables of interest, we include a set of additional variables in the regressions below in order to control for macroeconomic conditions and banking sector structure in the source and receiving countries. To control for the macroeconomic environment, we use data on real GDP from the WDI. Trade openness is measured, as is common in the literature, by the sum of exports and imports relative to GDP, again using data from the WDI. In order to control for de jure financial openness, we use an index of capital controls constructed by Chinn and Ito (2006, 2008) which is available at an annual frequency until 2011. It takes on values between -1.8 and 2.4 with higher values indicating weaker constraints on a country's capital account and hence a greater degree of de jure financial openness. Information on banking sector concentration comes from the Financial Structures Database by the World Bank (see Beck et al. 2000 and Čihák et al. 2012) , while the share of government owned banks is taken from Barth et al. (2013) . Moreover, we use information on banking systems' capital to asset ratio which is available from the WDI. In order to account for overall regulatory quality in an economy, we use the estimate of regulatory quality from the World Bank Governance Indicators. This index is defined on the interval -2.5 to 2.5 with greater values reflecting better regulatory quality. A summary table of all variables used and their sources can be found in Appendix A.
Regression model
The idea of our baseline estimation approach is to compare cross-border bank claims before and after the crisis between banking systems that were (a) operating under different regulatory regimes and (b) subject to different monetary policy changes. Our starting point is the estimation of the following cross-sectional specification:
where is the change in lending by country 's banking system to country post-versus pre-crisis.
As described above, it is defined as Δ = ln� � − ln� In a third step, we investigate to what extent and why cross-border bank flows within the euro area have evolved differently since the crisis. To this goal, a dummy variable indicating source and destination countries' membership in the euro area as well as interactions between this dummy and the explanatory variables of interest are included in the regression model:
Similarly, we shed light on emerging markets as a destination region of cross-border credit in order to understand to what extent the surge in global liquidity has affected these countries. In this case, destination country dummies for emerging market economies are included and interacted with destination country variables. Finally, we re-run the regression in equation (1) using the bilateral credit home bias as the dependent variable.
Regression results
Having data on changes in bilateral cross-border lending, banking regulation and unconventional monetary policy at hand, we are in the position to address the question how changes in regulatory and monetary policy have affected cross-border credit since the crisis. Table 2 presents the regression results for our baseline specification. Robust standard errors clustered at the destination country level are reported in brackets. With respect to the control variables, a higher level of (log) claims before the crisis reduces growth in cross-border lending. This can be interpreted as "reversion to the mean" in cross-border lending. Destination countries with larger increases in GDP attract more cross-border credit. Hence, economic performance is a pull factor for international credit. Moreover, the regression results are in line with the literature on institutional quality and international capital and trade flows (e.g. Anderson and Marcouiller 2002 , Levchenko 2007 , Papaioannou 2009 ). The more overall regulatory quality improves, the more international credit flows into the economy. Regarding the aggregate equity share of a recipient country banking system, a larger increase in this variable coincides with larger credit inflows. More intuitively, the larger the improvement in shock absorption capacity and hence the more stable a banking system gets, the larger are credit inflows. By contrast, the more open the source country gets for international trade in the pre/post crisis comparison, the lower is international credit extension by its banking system.
Determinants of changes in cross-border credit since the crisis
When including the change in regulatory arbitrage in the regressions (Table 2 , column 2), it appears that an increase in the arbitrage of regulatory capital stringency or supervisory independence between countries and leads to larger increases in cross-border credit from country to . Holding other things constant, a one-unit increase in the change in capital stringency arbitrage post-pre crisis leads to an increase in bilateral credit growth of 3.3%. 3 This finding is thus in line with Hypothesis 2:
Banks seem to exploit differences in regulatory stringency across countries, avoiding tighter regulation in their home economies. However, when including central bank asses relative to GDP in the model, the effect of regulatory arbitrage turns statistically insignificant (column 4).
As an alternative specification, we include regulatory changes in the source and in the recipient countries separately (column 5). Tighter capital regulation, both in the source and in the recipient country, seems to reduce bilateral credit growth, its effect on changes in international bank claims post-pre crisis is not statistically significant though. In line with Hypothesis 2, source countries that experienced larger increases in banking supervisory power or overall independence of the supervisor, however, saw larger increases in cross-border bank claims, i.e. larger outflows of bank credit. The positive impact of an increase in regulatory power or independence can thus be interpreted as a push factor of cross-border bank credit due to arbitrage motives. This finding complements previous literature which concentrates on normal times (see Houston et al. 2012) .
Another interpretation for these positive effects is that a more independent supervisor is less prone to political pressures towards financial protectionism; the more independent the supervisory authority, the less pressure towards a focus on the domestic market can be exerted by governments that supported domestic banking systems during the crisis.
In terms of substantial significance, our results suggest that the source country with the largest increase in supervisory power in our sample (Italy, increase by 6 units) is likely to have 60percentage points higher bank outflow growth post-pre crisis than the source country with the largest drop in supervisory power (Turkey, reduction by 3.5 units). An increase in the change in supervisory power in the source country post-pre crisis by one standard deviation leads to an increase in cross-border credit growth by 16 percentage points. Given the sample mean of the change in cross-border credit (10%, see Table 1 (a)), the effect of a change in source country regulation is economically important. In Table 3 , we add two variables that measure banking system structure to the baseline setup as a robustness check, namely banking sector concentration and the share of government owned banks in the source and destination country. Our previous results remain broadly unaffected. The effect of central bank assets relative to GDP gets even somewhat stronger. Interestingly, the coefficient on the change in overall capital stringency in the source country turns negative and statistically significant.
Hence, the larger the increase in capital stringency in the source country, the lower the growth in cross-border credit extended by its banks. In terms of the magnitude of this effect, our results suggest that a one standard deviation increase in the change in capital stringency in the source country post-pre crisis reduces post-pre crisis bilateral credit growth by 10 percentage points. Given the sample mean growth rate of cross-border credit, this effect is economically important. This negative link between stricter capital regulation in the source country and bilateral credit growth is in line with the observation that banks that became subject to tighter capital requirements deleveraged by reducing risky activities in foreign markets (Schildbach 2013). Hence, our results show that depending on the specific measure of financial regulation, the effects of changes in the source country regulatory environment can differ; whereas our findings for the effects of increasing capital stringency support hypothesis 1, the results for supervisory power and independence rather conform to hypothesis 2.
In order to check the robustness of the effect of expansive monetary policy with respect to different measurements of unconventional, liquidity increasing measures, we use reserves by commercial banks held at the central bank as an alternative proxy (once taken from the IFS Central Bank Survey and once taken from the IFS Depository Corporation Survey). 
Is the euro area different?
In Table 5 , we interact our variables of interest with dummies indicating whether a source or destination country is a member of the euro area. Control variables are included in all regressions but not reported for reasons of visibility. Column 3 presents the regression results based on equation (2) where both source and recipient country variables are interacted with a dummy that equals one if both countries and are members of the euro area. While the ratio of bank capital to assets in the source country does not matter for bilateral lending in all countries outside the euro area, a larger increase in this ratio within the euro area implies lower growth in cross-border credit post-pre crisis.
Hence, euro area banks which were highly engaged in cross-border lending in the run-up to the crisis cut back their international business more than other source countries in times of urgent needs for deleveraging. Moreover, our results point to the fact that increasing arbitrage in regulatory capital stringency within the euro area has discouraged cross-border lending; as noted above, this may be due to uncertainty and increased information and funding costs with respect to the implementation of tighter capital requirements across countries.
The effect of growth in central bank asset relative to GDP in the source countries from the euro area does not significantly differ from the rest of the country sample. However, the larger the increase in this monetary policy indicator in the euro area destination countries, the larger are the capital inflows to these countries in the post-pre crisis comparison.
Do source countries of cross-border credit differentiate between destination markets in the euro area and in emerging markets? A larger expansion of bank capital to assets in the source country also mitigates the change in cross-border lending to emerging destination countries (Table 6 ). Hence, euro area banking systems with larger increases in capital to asset ratios reduced cross-border activities both in the euro area and in emerging economies. Regarding different regulatory indicators, the results show that euro area banks lend more to emerging economies the larger the arbitrage in capital stringency and in supervisory independence gets. Consequently, while larger arbitrage in capital stringency within the euro area discourages bilateral lending, it encourages euro area banks to extend more credit to emerging markets.
Determinants of changes in cross-border credit in the pre-and the post-crisis period
Having seen that regulatory variables and unconventional monetary policy are important drivers of structural change in cross-border bank claims since the crisis, we now turn to the question whether these policy-related push and pull factors also matter for changes in international bank lending in the pre-and in the post-crisis period. less for growth in cross-border bank lending in the pre-crisis period with the majority of regression coefficients being statistically insignificant. 4 The only regulatory variable which affects international credit growth here is the 05/06 change in capital stringency in the source country. As opposed to the results presented in Table 3 , an increase in capital stringency induces more credit outflows from the source country before the crisis. This finding is, however, not robust to including 3-bank concentration and the share of government banks into the model in order to control for banking market structures. Moreover, changes in monetary policy, either proxied by changes in the size of the central bank balance sheet relative to GDP or by changes in reserves held at central banks, does not significantly impact cross-border bank flows -another difference to the results for adjustments in cross-border bank claims post-pre crisis.
What about driving factors of cross-border bank credit flows after the GFC? Having a look at Table 8 which presents results for growth in cross-border bank claims between 2010 and 2011, we can show that changes in financial regulation and monetary policy are more important than in the pre-crisis period: Country-pairs that have seen a greater increase in arbitrage regarding supervisory independence or power have experienced a larger growth in cross-border credit. Yet, growing arbitrage in capital stringency has led to weaker cross-border credit growth. This may indicate that different approaches to adopt the stricter capital ratios required by Basle III across countries have led 4 We have re-run the regressions presented in Table 2 on the smaller sample presented in Table 7 . Our previous results remain qualitatively unaffected.
to higher information costs for banks that engage in credit activities abroad. In addition, tighter capital requirements in the source country make funding and risky cross-border business more expensive. Consequently, international activities get less attractive. Interestingly, the coefficient estimates for the change in supervisory independence or supervisory power in the recipient countries (column 5) are negative for the post-crisis period, thus indicating that stricter regulation in the destination country discourages credit inflows. This supports the argument that banks are attracted by laxer regulatory environments (Hypothesis 2). Changes in central bank assets to GDP, both in the source and in the destination country, have a positive and significant effect on crossborder credit growth between 2010 and 2011. However, this result does not extend to reserves at central banks as a proxy for expansive monetary policy (not reported).
Determinants of changes in bilateral credit home bias
Since the GFC, home bias in banks and investors portfolios has significantly increased, especially in the euro area (e.g. Pockrandt and Radde 2012). In order to complement our analysis about the drivers of structural changes in cross-border lending, we now use the BIS data to compute proxies for bilateral home bias in banking systems' credit portfolios. We then use bilateral home bias as an alternative dependent variable and re-run the baseline regressions as laid out in equation (1) above.
Based on a Markowitz-type portfolio selection model, Fidora, Fratzscher and Thimann (2007) propose a measure of bilateral equity (bond) portfolio home bias. It relates a source country 's portfolio share invested in equity (bonds) of country relative to country 's share in global market capitalization. Adopting the concept of equity home bias to the credit market, we compute bilateral home bias in banking systems' credit portfolios as
where * denotes the market share of country in the global credit market, and is the fraction of cross-border credit extended by country to country in total credit of country . The world market share of country is computed as the sum of domestic credit in country plus the the sum across all credit inflows to country , namely ∑ =1 . It is the benchmark portfolio share considered here. The credit portfolio of country is computed as the sum of domestic credit and overall cross-border credit extended by banks from country
so that the share of credit from to in the source country's credit portfolio is given by = . We compute this measure at an annual frequency using the BIS data and two alternative measures of domestic credit. As a first measure of the volume of domestic credit, we use data on domestic credit by the banking sector relative to GDP from the WDI. We back out the level of domestic credit by multiplying the ratio with GDP. As a second measure, we use information on the level of domestic credit from the Depository Corporations Survey which is available from the IFS. Figure 3 illustrates the evolution of bilateral credit home bias for the regression sample. It presents both sample medians and sample means for each year, once for the full country sample and once for the euro area. The top panel plots home bias based on domestic credit data backed out from the WDI, while the bottom panel shows home bias based on domestic credit data from the IFS. All subplots reveal that bilateral credit home bias has significantly increased since the GFC. Moreover, it can be observed that within the euro area, home bias is lower than in the full country sample. Overall, the graphs are very similar for both measures of home bias. Given that the first measure is available for a larger sample, we opt for this variable in our regressions below.
As in the baseline setup for cross-border credit, we are interested in the policy-related drivers of changes in bilateral home bias in the post-pre crisis comparison. Therefore, we take the average of home bias across the period 2005-2007 and across 2010-2012 and take the difference between these two values for each country pair. Given that home bias takes on values between -1 and 1, the change in home bias is defined on the interval -2 and 2. claims. First of all, economic activity is important for the change in home bias. The larger GDP growth is in the source country, the larger gets home bias. Stronger GDP growth in the destination country reduces bilateral home bias, because better economic performance attracts foreign credit. Overall regulatory quality, both in the source and in the destination market, mitigates home bias, while larger increases in trade openness in the source country induce more credit home bias. Interestingly, the share of government banks matters for credit home bias. The larger the increase in this share has become since the crisis, the higher was the rise in bilateral credit home bias in the source country.
This may be interpreted as increased financial protectionism with especially public banks focusing more on domestic credit markets since the crisis.
Regulatory arbitrage regarding official supervisory power tends to reduce home bias (column 4), which is in line with the negative effect of the change in supervisory power in the source country (column 5). The larger the strengthening in official supervisory power in the source country, the more inclined is its banking system to shift credit business abroad. As opposed to this, the more independent supervisors in the source country got since the crisis, the more home bias increased.
Finally, in line with the effects of unconventional monetary policy presented above, source countries that experienced larger increases in the ratio of central bank assets relative to GDP have seen smaller increases in home bias.
Summary
The goal of this paper has been to analyze the importance of policy-related drivers of adjustments in cross-border bank credit and bilateral credit home bias since the global financial crisis. Our main results are summarized as follows.
First, the source countries which have experienced larger increases in financial supervisory power or supervisory independence between the post and the pre-crisis period have extended more credit abroad. In a similar vein, the larger the rise in arbitrage of these two regulatory indicators between the source and recipient country, the larger has been cross-border credit growth. By contrast, increasing capital stringency in the source country has discouraged cross-border lending, especially in the euro area. Given that increasing capital to asset ratios in the source country have mitigated crossborder credit activity as well, this finding is in line with the observation that banks have cut back risky cross-border activities when facing the need to deleverage.
Second, our results show that euro area banking systems have exploited increasing arbitrage in capital stringency with respect to recipient emerging economies. Yet, larger differentials in capital stringency within the euro area have reduced cross-border credit expansion. Our results thus reveal that the effect of changes in financial regulation differs depending on the specific aspect of regulation considered, and depending on the region of source and recipient countries.
Third, we find a highly significant and positive effect of unconventional expansive monetary policy on cross-border lending. Hence, monetary policy has mitigated the fragmentation in international credit markets since the crisis.
Finally, bilateral credit home bias has considerably increased since the crisis. We find that the effects Barth et al. (2013) Arbitrage is computed as difference between the regulatory variable in the source and recipient country, with a higher value implying stricter regulation in the source relative to the destination country.
Arbitrage in official supervisory power Barth et al. (2013) Arbitrage in independence of supervisor Barth et al. (2013) Bank capital to assets is the ratio of bank capital and reserves to total assets. Capital and reserves include funds contributed by owners, retained earnings, general and special reserves, provisions, and valuation adjustments. Capital includes tier 1 capital which is a common feature in all countries' banking systems, and total regulatory capital, which includes several specified types of subordinated debt instruments that need not be repaid if the funds are required to maintain minimum capital levels. Total assets include all nonfinancial and financial assets. Overall capital stringency index Index, 0-7 Barth et al. (2013) Whether the capital requirement reflects certain risk elements and deducts certain market value losses from capital before minimum capital adequacy is determined. Official supervisory power Index, 0-14 Barth et al. (2013) Whether the supervisory authorities have the authority to take specific actions to prevent and correct problems. 
